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I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court releases an opinion ad-
dressing the separation of church and state, the release often triggers ex-
aggerated emotional reactions from both sides of the cultural divide.
Good News Club v. Milford Central School' was no exception. An ultra-
separationist lobby, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, immediately predicted that the case would "create a battlefield out
of America's elementary schools" and called it a "terrible mistake."2
Meanwhile, several national news outlets only strengthened this re-
action by making sure that the holding's dull details did not get in the
way of sexy reporting. For instance, ABC News broadly reported that
the Supreme Court "ruled [that] religious groups must be allowed to
meet in public schools after school hours,"3 vaguely suggesting that the
Court's decision in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education4 had
been reversed. Similarly, CBS announced that the Court redrew the
lines separating church and state in public schools, a statement that im-
plicitly announced that the dissenters in Good News Club were correct,.
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edges the help of Andrew Bond, Class of 2002 and Roland Cross, Esq.
1. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
2. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court, Religion and Free Speech; Top Court Gives Reli-
gious Clubs Equal Footing in Grade Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2001, at 5A.
3. ABC News (ABC television broadcast, June 11, 2001).
4. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme Court invalidated a released time pro-
gram of the Champaign, Illinois school board, which permitted outside teachers from religious
groups to offer one hour of religious instruction per week during regular school hours. The
Court deemed this state sponsored program to breach the "wall between Church and State which
[sic] must be kept high and impregnable." Id. at 212. In Good News Club, there was no sponsor-
ship by the state, and the use of the property by private citizens occurred after school hours.
5. CBS News (CBS television broadcast, June 11, 2001). It was not the geography of the
ruling in redrawing boundaries, but the enfeebling of a structure that inspired the headline, "Su-
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For those who favored the decision, they speculated that it meant future
support both for President Bush's faith-based initiatives and for tuition
vouchers.6 However, the decision was surely not as far reaching as either
its opponents or its proponents suggested.
In fact, Good News Club posed a narrow and straightforward ques-
tion for the United States Supreme Court: does a public school district
violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when it has a
policy barring a private religious group from holding Bible classes for
children after school hours, but using school facilities, while the district
permits other, non-religious, private groups to use classrooms to teach
children about developing character and morality?
From one perspective, we can view the case as simply replaying the
earlier case of Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dis-
trict.7 Hence, the Court could focus on the question of whether its earlier
decision controlled. From another perspective, however, the explicit re-
ligious nature of the teaching in Good News Club arguably distinguishes
it from Lamb's Chapel, thus raising additional issues that the Court
needed to resolve.
Six of the nine Justices concluded that the teaching of Lamb's
Chapel was on point and, therefore, decided that the Milford School
Board violated the First Amendment by discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint. But the dissenters8 eroded the unanimity of the Court in
Good News Club by insisting that more than viewpoint discrimination
was at stake. They not only challenged the applicability of the earlier de-
cision, but they also raised issues concerning the nature of religious
speech in the First Amendment context. Two of them even took the
Milford School Board's defense that the Establishment Clause justified,
and indeed required, its policy as a credible proposition.9
preme Court's Rulings Weaken Church-State Wall." Supreme Court's Rulings Weaken Church-
State Wall, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 2001, at A16.
6. George F. Will, 'Good News' From the Court, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 2001, at 96.
7. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). In Lamb's Chapel, the Supreme Court held that a school district
engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when it denied a church group the oppor-
tunity to speak and show a film on childrearing and family values when other private groups had
been allowed to address those subjects. Id. at 397.
8. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). Given
the fundamental differences in viewpoint among commentators on the history and meaning of
the Establishment Clause, the reader is entitled to access prior expressions of the author's out-
look on that subject. See John E. Dunsford, Prayer in the Well: Some Heretical Reflections on the
Establishment Syndrome, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1984); John E. Dunsford, The Relevance of
Original Intention in Thinking About Establishment Clause Problems, 6 PUB. L. REV. 197 (1987);
John E. Dunsford, The Establishment Syndrome and Religious Liberty, 2 DUQ. L. REV. 139
(1964).
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Implications of Good News
On first impression, the issues in Good News Club look clear, famil-
iar, and manageable. However, like most disputes over the separation of
church and state that reach the Supreme Court, the simplest questions
seem to radiate larger concerns when examined more closely. In light of
some of the media coverage, one might wonder whether religious citi-
zens, particularly those who choose to engage in religious worship, repre-
sent a group of untouchables whose presence on public school property
at any time is suspect. In any event, Good News Club both once again
raised penetrating questions about the relationship between religion and
the public schools and continued the on-going dialogue regarding the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. The modest goal of this article is
to scrutinize some of the implications.
In particular, this article will examine: (1) whether Lamb's Chapel
should control; (2) whether there is a relevant distinction between reli-
gious viewpoint and subject matter; (3) whether a forum open to much
of the public may be limited to others; (4) whether the presence of prayer
and worship should affect the right of a private organization to access
public property; and (5) whether such use of public property violates the
Establishment Clause.
II. LAMB'S CHAPEL AS CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
Both Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club were decided under the
same New York law and, therefore, posed many similar questions. Un-
der New York law, local school boards in the state may open their facili-
ties for various public uses.' ° Pursuant to that power, the Milford Cen-
tral School District (Milford) adopted a community use policy that,
among other things, authorized the public to use its buildings after
school hours for "instruction in any branch of education, learning or the
arts"" and for "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment
events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community .... ",1
Permitted uses had to be nonexclusive and open to the general public. 3
The policy also specified that school premises could not be used "by any
individual or organization for religious purposes., 4
Under this policy, the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and 4-H Club were
allowed to use the facilities after school hours. In its interpretation and
application of the policy, Milford found no problem with programs de-
signed to develop the character and morals of children. Moreover, un-
10. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2000).
11. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. D1).
12. Id. at 102.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 103 (citing App. to Pet. For Cert. D2).
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doubtedly influenced by the earlier decision in Lamb's Chapel, Milford
held that an organization engaged in such activities could make its pres-
entations from a religious viewpoint."5
In Lamb's Chapel, operating under the same authorizing New York
law as in Good News Club, Center Moriches Union Free School District
(the School District) had a policy similar to Milford's, which permitted
members of the community to use school property outside school hours
for certain purposes.' 6 Moreover, the School District issued a rule stat-
ing that the "school premises shall not be used by any group for religious
purposes."' 7  Under the policy, an evangelical church and its pastor
sought to use the facilities to show a film series containing lectures by a
well-known Christian author and radio commentator. The presentation
intended to discuss the effect that the media were having in undermining
moral values and to urge a return to traditional Christian life with values
instilled in family members at an early age. The School District denied
the church's application, noting that "[t]his film does appear to be
church related and therefore your request must be refused."' 8 In a sec-
ond application by the church, it described the film as a "[flamily ori-
ented movie-from a Christian perspective."' 9 Again, the School Dis-
trict denied the request, citing the same reasons as before. Upholding
the School District's decision, the lower courts in Lamb's Chapel held
that, because the School District's policy had created a limited public fo-
rum, it had properly exercised its authority to exclude all uses of schoolproperty for religious use.2 In that way, all religions would be treated
alike, that is, excluded, and the policy would be viewpoint neutral.
Reversing the judgment of the lower court in Lamb's Chapel, the
Supreme Court assumed that the forum was indeed a limited one and ac-
cepted the School District's argument that the practical application of the
policy did not exclude all use of the property by religious groups.2 In
that regard, the School District pointed to instances in which permission
had been given to (1) a New Age religious group known as the "Mind
Center," (2) the Southern Harmonize Gospel singers, and (3) the Salva-
tion Army Youth Band.22 The Supreme Court concluded that, because
the School District had created a limited forum allowing presentations on
child rearing and family values, it could not then exclude Lamb's Chapel
15. Id. at 120.
16. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993).
17. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a).
18. Id. at 389 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 84).
19. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 91).
20. Id. at 389-90.
21. Id. at 392.
22. Id. at 391 n.5.
[Vol. 25:577
Implications of Good News
on the basis that its viewpoint on those subjects had a religious perspec-
tive. In other words, the School District was discriminating against a
particular point of view.23
Did the decision in Lamb's Chapel control the issue in Good News
Club? Milford and the lower courts did not think so. In the Good News
Club case, when the club applied for permission to use the classroom fa-
cilities after school, the Milford superintendent concluded that the re-
quest was actually to use the school property for "the equivalent of reli-
gious worship ... rather than the expression of religious views or values
on a secular subject matter."24 The superintendent's response may have
been induced by the club's application, in which it stated that the pro-
posed use was to have "a fun time of singing songs, hearing Bible les-
son[s] and memorizing scripture."25 Subsequently, the club's attorney
provided Milford with a more detailed description in reply to a request
for more information on the club's activities. This information was re-
ported in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court:
The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking atten-
dance. As she calls a child's name, if the child recites a Bible
verse the child receives a treat. After attendance, the Club sings
songs. Next Club members engage in games that involve, inter
alia, learning Bible verses. Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible
story and explains how it applies to Club members' lives. The
Club closes with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier distributes treats
and the Bible verses for memorization.26
Other materials submitted by the club to the superintendent in-
cluded a copy of the "Daily Bread," prayer booklet that the lower court
noted "contained stories that refer to the second coming of Christ, ac-
cepting the Lord Jesus as the Savior, and believing in the Resurrection
and in the descent of the Lord Jesus from Heaven."27 Both the superin-
tendent and the lower courts considered this as going beyond the expres-
sion of a viewpoint on morality and instead constituted subject matter
that was "quintessentially religious. '"28
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter emphasized the religious
aspects of the instruction by detailing the content of the teaching.29 He
notes that the classes began and closed with a prayer, that the children
23. Id. at 394.
24. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 2000).
25. Id.
26. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 103 (2001) (citing 202 F.3d at
507).
27. Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 507.
28. Id. at 510.
29. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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are instructed that the Bible tells them how sins can be forgiven by re-
ceiving the Lord Jesus Christ, that the lesson plan instructs the teacher
to lead a child to Christ, and that it emphasizes that the words of the Bi-
ble are true because God said them. The teacher challenges the children
to ask God for the strength they need and to place God first in their
lives. The "unsaved" are invited to receive Christ as their savior and to
believe God's word, raising their hands if they would like to believe in
the Savior. The teacher seeks to meet with any unsaved children to show
them how they can receive everlasting life.3"
In Justice Souter's view, this is not merely discussion of a subject
from a particular Christian point of view, but instead represents an evan-
gelical service of worship.3 On that basis, he believes that the lower
courts were correct in distinguishing the case from Lamb's Chapel.32
Agreeing with the appellate court and district court, Souter asserts that
the facts in Good News Club were as different from Lamb's Chapel "as
night from day."33
To the contrary, Justice Thomas concludes for the majority that
the exclusion of the club from the forum "based on its religious nature"
is indistinguishable not only from Lamb's Chapel, but also from Rosen-
berger v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia.34 " Starting with
the premise that the evidence makes it clear that the club taught moral
and character development,36 the Supreme Court's majority opinion
maintains that the only reason Milford excluded the club from school
property was because it taught those lessons from a religious viewpoint.
Justice Thomas pointed out that in Lamb's Chapel, there was a message
that was also "quintessentially religious" conveyed in a film in order to
build character and moral development.37 Similarly, in this case, the club
tried to build character and moral development through storytelling and
prayer, and the difference in methods between the two cases was hardly
of any legal consequence. 38
30. Id. at 137.
31. Id. at 138.
32. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 137.
33. Id.
34. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
35. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. In Rosenberger, Justice Souter similarly found writ-
ings in a student-run publication promoting a Christian view of life to be the "preaching of the
word" and evangelical in nature. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). In
that case, student fees subsidized the publication, a major distinguishing point from Good News
Club. See id.
36. Id. at 108.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Id. at 109-10.
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The majority flatly rejected the appellate court's conclusion that the
Club's activities could not qualify as a pure discussion of morals and
character under Lamb's Chapel because they included religious instruc-
tion and prayer.39 The lower court had reasoned that the conduct of the
meeting went beyond merely stating a viewpoint. The court noted that
there was a distinction between "the discussion of secular subjects from a
religious viewpoint and the discussion of religious material through reli-
gious instruction and prayer. 40
The majority disagreed, arguing that simply because something is"quintessentially religious" or "decidedly religious in nature" does not
mean that it "cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of
morals and character development from a particular viewpoint. '41 In-
stead, the majority found an analogy between teaching character and
morals through the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, and patriotism and
the effort to achieve the same purpose through the invocation of Christi-
anity.42 In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia echoes the same theme by
writing that the club's use of religious teaching to buttress its teaching of
morality is only doing what other secular groups do to exhort their
charges to follow their idea of morality by giving their pupils reasons to
do so and examples to follow. 43
The question of whether Lamb's Chapel should control opened into
a larger question of whether there was any workable distinction that the
Court could draw between religious viewpoint and religious subject mat-
ter. The majority and the dissenters deeply disagreed about the viability
and desirability of such a distinction. The following section will delve
into the practicality of such a distinction and whether the distinction has
any relevance.
III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RELIGION AS VIEWPOINT AND
RELIGION AS SUBJECT MATTER
In its narrowest focus, the difference between the majority and the
dissenters in Good News Club came down to whether the club was en-
gaged in speech about morals and character from a religious viewpoint or
whether it was engaged in activities representing religious worship and
proselytization. In some formulations, the distinction has been phrased
as one between religion as viewpoint and religion as subject matter. Ac-
cepting for the moment the relevance of this choice of alternatives as cru-
39. See id. at 111.
40. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Bronx
Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1997)).
41. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 124.
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cial to the legality of the club's exclusion, it appears that the club en-
gaged in both. Neither party disputes that. The more pertinent ques-
tions would be: "Does it matter?" and "Who should classify?"
It did matter to the panel of the Second Circuit, which seemingly
worked off the premise that although the club was attempting to incul-
cate values in the children (such as obeying parents and resisting jeal-
ousy),44 it invalidated the enterprise in the eyes of the law when it intro-
duced a religious "layer" to accomplish that task.4" Seeking to explain
why the presence of the religious "layer" produced this consequence, the
lower court only suggested that, because the conduct was "quintessen-
tially religious," it was now subject matter rather than a viewpoint and,
hence, beyond the scope of the limited forum.46 Apparently the court
could not fathom how the aspiration to be "saved" could contribute to
moral growth. Paradoxically, in using religion to buttress its viewpoint,
the court deemed that the club was sacrificing the latter.
Agreeing with the lower court in his dissent, Justice Souter also re-
lied on what he took to be an unchallenged and legitimate restriction of
the forum based on the fact that the policy statement states that "school
premises shall not be used ... for religious purposes."47 But this com-
ment begs the question because, even though Milford sought to restrict
the forum in its policy statement, the school had opened the forum under
the analysis in Lamb's Chapel to arguably religious purposes by allowing
other groups to teach morals and character in the school after school
hours.
Justice Souter seems to ignore this conundrum by simply declaring
that the club is not only discussing a subject from a Christian point of
view, but is also engaging in an evangelical service of worship seeking to
convert children.4" Unfortunately, this does not answer the question of
why the addition of religious trappings means the club's presentation
conveys any less of a viewpoint on character and morals.49 As the major-
ity opinion points out, even assuming that the Court interprets state law
to require a local school board to exclude purely religious purposes from
44. Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 509.
45. See id. at 510.
46. Id. "Accordingly, the Milford School's decision to exclude the Good News Club from its
facilities was based on content not viewpoint." Id. at 511.
47. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). In fairness to Justice Souter, we must recall that he is
postulating that the permission for the Good News Club to hold its meeting may violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.
49. Id. at 110-12. The majority comments that the court of appeals did not determine that
the club's activities constituted religious worship. Id. at 112 n.4. "In any event," the majority
continues, "we conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious worship, di-
vorced from any teaching of moral values." Id.
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the forum, an exclusion based on religious perspective nevertheless "con-
stitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination."50
Reflecting the analysis of the panel of the court of appeals, the ap-
proach of the Souter dissent apparently rests on the judgment that reli-
gious beliefs or activities, once they reach a certain threshold, can no
longer be viewpoints or perspectives on the teaching of morals or charac-
ter. Relying on a prior decision,51 the Second Circuit had spelled out this
view when it stated that it "is not difficult for school authorities to make
the distinction between the discussion of secular subjects from a religious
viewpoint and the discussion of religious materials through religious in-
struction and prayer."52  The lower court thus isolated morality as a
secular subject from the matter of religious instruction, the latter pre-
sumably apart and beyond the cognizance of the civil order. Neither the
Second Circuit nor Justice Souter seemed to think it was possible for
some people to derive their morality from the substance of their religious
convictions and to be motivated in this endeavor by religious activities
such as prayer. Circuit Judge Jacobs, dissenting in the lower court, put
the matter nicely:
The distinction [between content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination] is especially slippery where the viewpoint in
question is religious, in part because the sectarian religious per-
spective will tend to look to the deity for answers to moral ques-
tions. The idea that moral values take their shape and force
from God seems to me to be a viewpoint for the consideration of
moral questions.5 3
An amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court by twenty
theologians and religious scholars (theologians' brief) reviews a range of
spiritual beliefs and makes the same point by challenging the premise
that an easily identifiable distinction exists between "religious instruc-
50. Id. at 112.
51. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 207 (2d Cir.
1997).
52. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Bronx
Household, 127 F.3d at 215).
53. Id. at 514 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). In Judge Jacob's opinion, "when the subject matter is
morals and character, it is quixotic to attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and reli-
gious subject matters." Id. at 512. Commenting on this distinction in Rosenberger, the Supreme
Court (Kennedy, J., writing) states the following:
[D]iscrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a subset or particular instance
of the more general phenomenon of content discrimination. And, it must be acknowl-
edged, the distinction is not a precise one. It is, in a sense, something of an under-
statement to speak of religious thought and discussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct
from a comprehensive body of thought.
Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995) (citations
omitted).
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tion" and "religious perspective. '5 4 The theologians' brief notes that
faith groups vary significantly on their opinions of the underlying ques-
tion, and the effort to apply and administer such a distinction would em-
broil the Court in controversial judgments regarding the meaning and
application of religious doctrine. To compound the difficulty, when a
court calls an activity "worship," it is often using that term based on the
group's own characterization. 55
Additionally, the theologians' brief points out that scholars have
hotly contested the relation between "God's will" and "the good" since
philosophy and theology began to interact and contends that the Second
Circuit unknowingly took a position on this question by assuming that"morality is derived from sources other than religion. '"56 However, this
assumption is the very point in dispute. Whatever we may say on behalf
of the validity of this assumption, it does not represent the outlook of
many theological traditions in our society, including those of the Hebrew
Bible, Post-Biblical Judaism, Islamic Sources, the Pauline Epistles, Prot-
estant Sources, or Roman Catholicism, the traditions that the theologi-
ans' brief lists and discusses.57
The notion that religious and moral instruction are different "sub-
jects" and that we may readily distinguish them is contrary to what
many religious leaders experience and teach. The religious traditions
mentioned in the brief often take the opposite view of the matter and
maintain that religious and moral instruction are either a unified whole
or are so deeply intertwined as to be inseparable. Hence, the theologians
and scholars argue that the Second Circuit itself had ironically commit-
ted viewpoint discrimination when it adopted one view over another re-
specting the relation between "God's will" and "the good. 58
Justice Stevens, who wrote a separate dissenting opinion, chose a
different approach to the problem.59 While ultimately relying, as Jus-
tices Souter and Ginsberg did, on the validity of Milford's limitation of
the forum, Stevens separated the "religious purposes" mentioned in the
policy statement into three possible types of religious speech.60 He stipu-
lates that some religious speech is "simply speech about a particular topic
54. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Twenty Theologians and Scholars of Religion in Support
of Petitioners, Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98 (No. 99-2036) (2001) [hereinafter Brief for Theolo-
gians].
55. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (citing Chess v. Widmar, 480
F. Supp. 907, 910 (1979)) (White, J., dissenting).
56. Brief for Theologians, supra note 54, at 8.
57. Id. at 13-26.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130.
60. Id.
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from a religious point of view";6' that some religious speech amounts to
worship "or its equivalent";6 2 and that some religious speech proselytizes
by nature or inculcates belief in a particular faith. 3 While the First
Amendment potentially protects all of these forms of speech against ac-
tion by the state, Stevens believes that public school authorities may cre-
ate a limited forum on school property in which they exclude the second
and third types of religious speech by private organizations.64 In the pre-
sent instance, proselytizing speech becomes the center of his analysis.6"
Stevens compares the Good News Club and its proselytizing meet-
ings to a political organization trying to recruit members.66 He concludes
that Milford may exclude these kinds of meetings because "[s]uch re-
cruiting meetings may introduce divisiveness and tend to separate young
children into cliques that undermine the schools' educational mission. 67
However, there are some obvious weakness in this analysis, not the least
of which is that state education law permits a school district to allow the
use of school property "for holding political meetings."68  Moreover,
what Justice Stevens labels proselytization amounts to the religious and
moral training of young children whose parents approved their children's
presence and participation. Thus, any recruitment of "new" members is
by dispensation of their mothers and/or fathers.69 Finally, Stevens
seems to equate proselytizing with the inculcation of belief although the
two activities are not necessarily identical.
61. Id. The example given is the film on child rearing in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993).
62. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130. The reference here is to Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981).
63. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130. Justice Stevens believes that this category of religious
speech falls between the other two.
64. Id. at 133.
65. Id. at 132. Justice Scalia twits the dissenters for being unable to agree on what category
of religious speech the club's activities represent, pointing out that Justice Souter describes them
as an evangelical service of worship. Id. at 125-26. (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 131.
67. Id. at 131-32. This sentiment is reminiscent of Justice Stevens' concurrence in Board of
Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring), in which he deplored the
possibility that children of the strict Satmar Hasidic sect of Judaism might be shielded from con-
tacts with the "different ways" of others, increasing the likelihood that they would remain faith-
ful adherents of their parents' faith. In Grumet, involving the creation of a special school district
to accommodate members of the sect, Justice Stevens noted that there was a "strong public inter-
est in promoting diversity and understanding in the public schools." Id. In Good News Club,
however, the state was not responsible for any of the after school teaching or the composition of
the private groups doing it.
68. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414, l(e) (McKinney 2001). This section prohibits meetings spon-
sored by political organizations "unless authorized by a vote of a district meeting held as pro-
vided by law of, in cities by the beard of education thereof." Id.
69. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115.
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Nevertheless, Justice Stevens candidly and directly dissects the
elements of the issue before him, serving to expose the ambiguity of the
policy limiting the forum and the resulting subjectivity of its application.
He acknowledges that while the policy statement bars groups from using
school premises for religious purposes, the school board did not intend to
exclude all speech from a religious point of view.7" In that regard, Justice
Stevens points out that testimony established that the superintendent of
the Milford School District was willing to permit individuals to teach
Creationism while contemporaneously interpreting the policy to exclude
any speech that promoted the Gospels. 1 The more that Stevens de-
scribes the fine points of the policy,72 the more apparent it becomes that
the school officials had elastic and potentially boundless discretion to de-
cide just how much religion was acceptable and how much was too
much.
If for no other reason, the standards that the dissenters implicitly
suggest to distinguish between religious perspective and religious con-
tent are unacceptable because they would inevitably entangle the law
in a determination of the permissible dosage of religious inspiration
allotted to private individuals who teach morals and character to chil-
dren. However, rather than raising the troublesome question of
whether religious speech has religion as its subject or merely a reli-
gious viewpoint, many of the religious-speech-in-public- schools cases
actually turn on a related (and no less problematic) question of what
type of forum the school represents.
IV. RELIGION AND THE CHOICE OF FORUM
Central to Good News Club is the government's specification of the
forum. While the Supreme Court has addressed the right of private ac-
cess to public property in a series of cases and endeavored to lay down
the broad lines of differentiation from one forum to another, how to ap-
ply these categories to specific situations is often in dispute. In part,
these disputes are stimulated by shifting terminology when defining the
types. For purposes of the present analysis, we will use the guidelines
that the Supreme Court set out in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n" as markers. Generally speaking, there are the follow-
ing three types of forum: (1) the public or traditional forum, deemed to
be open to expressive activity for all forms of assembly or debate; (2) the
70. Id. at 132.
71. Id. at 132-33.
72. Id. After conceding that "[t]his case is undoubtedly close," id., Justice Stevens speaks
of being persuaded that the school district can exclude the proselytizing speech even if it does not
represent worship. Id. at 133-34.
73. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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designated or limited forum, opened by the government for certain types
of expressive activity or assembly; and (3) the nonpublic forum, which
the state reserves for its own functions and purposes with respect to
communications by outsiders.74
A. Shifting Definitions
Despite the apparent clarity at each level, specifying the nature of
the forum becomes elusive. For example, we often equate the public fo-
rum with state property where we traditionally accept that everyone is
free to express an opinion (think Hyde Park). Yet the range of participa-
tion may be limited to those who are students at a state university, and
the forum may still be characterized as public.7" More perplexing is the
line of demarcation between designated and nonpublic fora. In Perry,
the Supreme Court described a designated forum as one that is not tradi-
tional and that the state has opened to the public for expressive activity76
while the Court also refers in a footnote to a public forum as one "created
for a limited purpose" such as use by certain groups77 (for example, the
members of student groups in Widmar v. Vincent). This suggests that,
by merely designating it as such, the State can craft a "limited forum"
although, to the extent that the forum is open, there cannot be any exclu-
sion based on content unless there is a compelling state interest and a re-
striction narrowly drawn to serve that purpose. The third category, the
non-public forum-not a traditional or designated one-is found where
the State reserves property for its own purposes. Nevertheless, the State
in that instance may grant access to others on the basis of subject matter
and speaker identity as long as the distinctions that the State draws are
reasonable in light of the purpose that the forum serves.7"
Evidently, there is a definitional overlap here between a designated
forum, which may be limited,79 and a nonpublic forum, which the gov-
ernment may enlarge by granting access to it. The limited public forum
may be considered a subset of the designated one or an outgrowth of the
nonpublic. Not only that, but also the legal criteria for measuring a fo-
rum's validity may hinge on how it is characterized. In a designated fo-
rum, the state may not exclude groups from participating because of
speech content without first demonstrating a compelling state interest,
74. Id. at 45-46. Once a forum is opened, the state may enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. Id. at 46.
75. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
77. Id. at 46 n.7. For example, student groups or school board members.
78. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citing
Perry, 460 U.S. at 49).
79. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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while it may restrict access to a nonpublic forum if it acts reasonably and
in a viewpoint neutral manner."0
B. A Limited Public Forum
In Good News Club, the Supreme Court accepted the agreement of
the parties that Milford had created a limited public forum.8" Concern-
ing such a forum, the state may impose limitations only if they are "rea-
sonable and viewpoint neutral."82 Once the parties established the char-
acter of the forum, it would seem to follow that, since the district opened
its property after school hours to organizations such as the Boy Scouts for
teaching morality and character to children, a religious organization also
had a claim under the First Amendment to pursue a similar purpose for
other children from its own viewpoint.
The resistance of both the dissenting Justices and the Second Cir-
cuit to such a conclusion is surprising and appears to derive from the un-
articulated premise that the accompanying religious exercises of such an
organization is intolerable on public property, particularly school prop-
erty, even for consenting adults and their progeny. Apart from the dis-
senters' efforts to distinguish the case from Lamb's Chapel, they also rely
on how Milford restricted the forum in its community use policy to the
effect that the "premises shall not be used by any individual or organiza-
tion for religious purposes. "83
Justice Stevens believed both that Milford was reasonable in closing
the forum to religious proselytizing and that the exclusion was done in an
evenhanded manner so as not to constitute viewpoint discrimination.8 4
Justice Souter relied on the fact that, in the district court, the club had
not challenged the reasonableness of the policy prohibiting religious
use." In his judgment, both proselytizing and worship fall within that
prohibition. 6
On the subject of forum, certain propositions with respect to Mil-
ford's control of its property are not in doubt and help narrow the area of
uncertainty. Milford unquestionably had the authority under New York
80. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
81. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
82. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 217 (2d Cir.
1997) (Cabranas, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 829-31 (1995)).
83. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 135-36 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 132 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, Justice Scalia maintained that the reason-
ableness of the forum limitation was before the Supreme Court because the appellate court had
addressed the argument of reasonableness on the merits. Id. at 122 n. 1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 126 n.3.
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law to determine the uses to which the property in its custody might be
put.87 In other words, Milford was not required to permit any member
of the public to enter school property for any purpose other than the
educational functions assigned to the district. Originally, then, the
school could be considered a nonpublic forum.
C. Interpretation of the New York Statute
Although the school was originally a nonpublic forum, the New
York statute provided that outsiders could use it for some ten different
purposes other than the educational functions performed by the school."8
In this list of permitted purposes, there are only two references to relig-
ion. Paragraph 1(d) of section 414 reads:
For' meetings, entertainments and occasions where admission
fees are charged, when the proceeds thereof are to be expended
for an educational or charitable purpose; but such use shall not
be permitted if such meetings, entertainments and occasions are
under the exclusive control, and the said proceeds are to be ap-
plied for the benefit of a society, association or organization of a
religious sect or denomination, or of a fraternal, secret or exclu-
sive society or organization other than organizations of veterans
of the military, naval and marine service of the United States
and organizations of volunteer ... firefighters or volunteer am-
bulance workers. 89
Paragraph 16) of section 414 reads: "For graduation exercises
held by not-for-profit elementary and secondary schools, provided
that no religious service is performed."90
When Milford's School Board adopted a community use policy
pursuant to this statue, it incorporated a number of the permitted pur-
poses. These purposes set very broad limits for the forum the district
was creating. In effect, they permitted any kind of meeting pertaining to
the welfare of the community.9'
However, as noted above, in both Good News Club and Lamb's
Chapel, the school district included a statement in its community use
policy that no group should use school premises for religious purposes.
The message that that restriction conveys is both broad and potentially
ambiguous. Taken literally, the policy would disqualify any group of
87. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2001).
88. Id.
89. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 414, 1(d).
90. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414, 1(j). This raises a nice question: presuming that the state
permits a non-profit school to use the property for a graduation, can the state then condition the
use on rejection of religious expression?
91. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 504 (2d Cir. 2000).
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citizens seeking to come onto the property from being motivated by re-
ligion for their speech activity, whatever its nature. In effect, such a
reading would seem pointedly hostile toward religion, treating such ac-
tivity as a pariah to social intercourse. In separatist terms, the exclusion
would be fundamental, posting a "keep out" sign for those whose social
lifestyle in any way reflected religious manifestations.
On the other hand, if authorities allow for the presence of a reli-
gious component, it evidences an ambiguity in the interpretation of the
phrase "religious purposes." That is what happened in Lamb's Chapel
when the school began opening the forum for use by such groups as gos-
pel singers, a new age organization, and the Salvation Army Youth
Band.92 It is also what happened in Good News Club when Milford al-
lowed access to the Boy Scouts, who met to teach character development
and spiritual growth. Such ambiguity undermines a school district's
ability to apply the policy objectively.
A more fundamental question is whether Milford (or even the New
York Legislature) can exclude speech based on its religious nature from
accessing school property even though the facilities are otherwise open to
expressive activity. In its opinion in Good News Club, the Supreme
Court identified a number of cases in which this type of issue has sur-
faced in various contexts recently, evidencing some conflict in the deci-
sions among the circuits.93
In answering the question of whether a state that opens a limited
public forum may then exclude religion as improper subject matter, it
may be instructive to trace the development of New York law prior to
Good News Club.
The New York statute does not expressly mention the use of public
property for religious purposes (except on those occasions where admis-
sion charges are to be paid for the benefit of a religious denomination or,
more recently, at commencements).94 In 1979, however, an intermediate
state court concluded that under section 414 of the New York statute,
the board of education had no statutory authority to allow groups to use
92. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391 n.5 (1993).
93. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001) (citing Gentala v. Tuc-
son, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (funding for special event services would violate); Campbell
v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a prayer meeting could be
excluded); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 217 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that use for church service could be prohibited); Church on the Rock v. Albu-
querque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a senior center had to allow a religious
film); Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that the School District had to provide access in a case dealing with the same Good News
group)).
94. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 1(d), 1(j) (McKinney 2001).
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school property for religious purposes before or after the class day. "s
The court relied on the fact that the only purposes permitted under the
statute were nonreligious in nature.96 In that case, the board denied a
student Bible club permission to meet on school property before or after
classes because it had a religious purpose.97
This state court interpretation of the New York law was later
adopted by the Second Circuit in a case where a church had requested a
permit to hold worship services and instruction in the public school on
Sunday morning while its own facilities were being renovated.9" At this
stage, the church argued that since a limited public forum had been cre-
ated, religious organizations were entitled to access under the broad pur-
poses described in the statement of community use that the board of
education issued. But the court of appeals responded as follows:
Nor are the activities of the Deeper Life church really similar to
those purposes enumerated in section 414, as appellee argues.
The subdivisions of the statute and the Commissioner's deci-
sions ... interpreting those provisions demonstrate ... that ac-
cess to the school property is permitted only where its serves the
interests of the public in general, rather than that of sectarian
groups. Appellee argues that because its services are open and
widely advertised to the general public, this meets the require-
ments of section 414. It seems clear, however, that the church's
activities are primarily for its own benefit, that is, to increase its
membership and raise the funds to pay for its renovations. And
while appellee argues that it should come under section
414(l)(a)'s provision that opens the schools "[f]or the purpose of
instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts," the
thrust of the statute is to promote general knowledge, rather
than to provide a forum for proselytizing or indoctrinating the
public in a particular group's beliefs.99
In effect, the Second Circuit was saying that there is no public in-
terest in permitting religious groups to operate because they are dedi-
cated to their own narrow parochial interests, a point that no doubt
might also be made, if one were inclined to make it, about virtually every
non-religious groups.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. This was before the passage of the Equal Access Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994).
98. Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 680 (2d
Cir. 1988) (referring to the regulations of the Board of Education of the City of New York). For
subsequent developments, see Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79, 83
(2d Cir. 1991).
99. Deeper Life, 852 F.2d at 680.
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In reaching its decision in the Lamb's Chapel case, the Second Cir-
cuit relied on its precedents and found that New York had created a lim-
ited public forum that excluded religious uses. The court rejected the
argument that the school board was not viewpoint-neutral when it de-
nied the church the opportunity to show a religious film.' 0 It concluded
that the State had imposed a blanket exclusion on religiously oriented
speech and that the board of education had not made any exceptions to
that policy.'' Thus, according to the Second Circuit, the test of whether
there was any viewpoint discrimination turned on whether the property
had been opened to religious purposes in the past."2 Once it found that
there were no prior religious uses, the court upheld the board of educa-
tion's decision. 103
Subsequently, in Bronx Household of Faith, the Second Circuit up-
held a school district's decision to reject a request by an evangelical
Christian church to rent a public school gymnasium for conducting
church worship each Sunday.0 4 The community use policy of the dis-
trict stated:
No outside organization or group may be allowed to conduct re-
ligious services or religious instruction on school premises after
school. However, the use of school premises by outside organi-
zations or groups after school for the purposes of discussing reli-
gious material or material which [sic] contains a religious view-
point or for distributing such material is permissible."0 '
This distinction between religious services and religious instruction
on one hand and the discussion of religious materials or material contain-
ing a religious viewpoint on the other is similar to the distinction that the
lower court brought into play when it decided the Good News Club
case. 106
This sequence of cases tracking how doctrine has evolved in the
Second Circuit reveals the prevailing principle that, in a limited public
forum, a viewpoint on a subject open for discussion cannot be ex-
cluded even if it is religious in nature.
But there still remains unsettled issues regarding whether, for
purposes of defining the parameters of a forum, the state may exclude
100. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Morichos Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 389 (2d Cir.
1992).
101. Id. at 388.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 389.
104. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 207 (2d Cir.
1997).
105. Id. at 210.
106. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510-11 (2d Cir. 2000).
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religious services or religious instruction standing alone, that is, inde-
pendent of any discussion of a secular subject. In that regard, we
should note that Justice Thomas in Good News Club made it clear that,
on the facts, the club's activities did not constitute "religious worship,
divorced from any teaching of moral values."' 7
V. DOES PRAYER OR WORSHIP BY A PRIVATE GROUP DIMINISH
ITS RIGHT OF EQUAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY?
Religious worship itself is considered to be a form of speech. That
issue was raised before the Supreme Court when a state university at-
tempted to bar a student organization from using its campus meeting
rooms because the student organization desired to use them for religious
worship and discussion.' In his dissent, Justice White contended that
the Free Speech Clause does not cover religious worship." 9 However,
the Court expressly ruled that both religious worship and religious dis-
cussion are "forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment.""' Explaining its conclusion, the Supreme Court main-
tained that any attempt to distinguish religious appeals or instructions
(such as singing hymns, reading scripture, or teaching the Bible) from
other forms of speech consisting of worship would be unintelligible.1 '
Even if it were intelligible, the effort to draw that line would be beyond
judicial competence, in effect calling for courts to determine what repre-
sents worship for different groups and congregations. Judges would
have to inquire about and make judgments concerning the significance
that should be attributed to the various words and practices of religious
faiths."'
In a recent case, Campbell v. St. Tammany's School Board," 3 the
Court directly addressed the subject of religious worship in a limited
public forum and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration fol-
107. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001).
108. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
109. Id. at 285 (White, J., dissenting). In arguing that the speech used in religious worship
is not protected by the Free Speech Clause, Justice White relies on precedents in which the state
had made the speech its own or somehow was sponsoring it. E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (regarding posting a copy of the Ten Commandments in a classroom); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (concerning prayer in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (concerning prayer in public schools); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
(concerning declaration of belief in God as a condition of employment by the state). But the
worship in question in the present instance is the speech of private entities.
110. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
111. Id. at 269 n.6. According to the Court, the unintelligibility derives from the absence
of any guides to indicate when "singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical princi-
ples" would cease to be singing, reading, and teaching protected by the Free Speech Clause. Id.
112. Id. at 269-70 n.4.
113. 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000).
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lowing the decision in Good News Club."4 In Campbell, Sally Campbell
and the Louisiana Christian Coalition sought to use public school facili-
ties after hours for a prayer meeting. The group declared that the object
of the meeting was to "worship the Lord in prayer and music. .. to dis-
cuss family and political issues, pray about those issues, and seek to en-
gage in religious and Biblical instruction with regard to those issues.""S
The school district in question had a policy of permitting groups to use
the facilities for, among other things, civic, recreational, and entertain-
ment purposes that were open to the public and pertained to the "welfare
of the public.""' 6 However, the policy expressly excluded partisan politi-
cal activity, for-profit fund raising, or "religious services or religious in-struction."1
A panel of the Fifth Circuit recognized that the choice between
finding that the forum was a designated public forum and finding that it
was a nonpublic one would be crucial in deciding the legality of the re-
strictions. Since there were at least a few other prohibitions in the policy
on other types of speech uses (partisan political meetings, for-profit fund
raising), the court concluded the district policy was not a public forum."'
The court felt that the school district had met the requisite standards for
allowing limited public access: the "limits must reasonably relate to the
purposes of the forum and may discriminate only on the basis of content,
not viewpoint."'9 In the court's view, the ban on religious activities dis-
criminated based on content, that is, the subject of religion, not view-
point, that is, a religious perspective on a subject. Hence, it was not un-
constitutional in a non-public forum. Expanding on this view, the court
found that "religious services and instruction are not simply approaches
to a topic, but activities whose primary purpose is to teach and experi-
114. Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 533 U.S. 913 (2001).
115. Campbell, 206 F.3d at 484.
116. Id.
117. Id. The school district did permit discussion of religious materials or material
containing a religious viewpoint, which led the district court to find that the policy was
unconstitutionally vague. According to the district court, there was no way of telling when
speech involving a religious viewpoint crossed over into the forbidden religious instruction or
worship. However, the court of appeals found that the core meaning of the terms defining the
exclusion was clear. While there might be ambiguity and blurring in drawing the line between
instruction and discussion, "that effect is no more than the limits of language stretched by the
active imagination of hypothesized application." Id.
118. Id. at 487. Since there were few limitations on use, the court conceded that the policy
"skates close to establishing a designated public forum through indiscriminate use," id. at 486,
but ultimately found that the restrictions "are minimally sufficient to maintain the school build-
ings' status as a non-public forum." Id. at 487.
119. Id. at 487 (citing Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995)).
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ence the subject of religion. These are activities distinct from a topical
discussion, a social gathering, or a political meeting. 121
A split court denied a petition to the Fifth Circuit for rehearing.1 21
In a per curiam opinion, the majority reaffirmed the view that the forum
was a limited public one, "reserved for recreational and civic activi-
ties. ' 122 The policy itself stated that it was creating a "limited public fo-
rum" and had expressly excluded partisan political activity, for-profit
fund raising, and "religious services or religious instruction. 12'  The
opinion pointed out that a contrary decision might diminish the oppor-
tunity for freedom of speech because the school board would have to
consider closing its doors to all applications who wished to use the facili-
ties after school hours. If the school district could exclude partisan po-
litical activity, the majority reasoned that the district could also restrict
religious services.1 24 According to the per curiam opinion, St. Tam-
many's policy was rational because the district wanted to avoid the per-
ception that it favored either some political parties or some religions over
others.12S
However, a group of five judges in the Fifth Circuit dissented from
the denial of hearing en banc 1 26 Considering the large number and wide
range of organizations that the district allowed to use the facilities, as well
as the standards it had announced in creating the forum, the dissenters
argued that the forum was generally open to the public even though lim-
ited. Thus, a content based exclusion of religion was "censorship pure
and simple. ' 127 Beyond that, even if the forum was non-public, exclud-
ing religion was unreasonable in light of the broad standards measuring
the scope of the forum. In that context, prohibiting religion could be
nothing more than viewpoint discrimination. 128
Both Campbell and Good News Club failed to resolve the testing
question of whether it is unconstitutional for a governmental body to ex-
clude religious worship or religious instruction standing alone from a fo-
rum that it has opened to a variety of uses by other groups. 2 Whether
it is labeled a limited public forum, a designated forum, or a nonpublicforum may be largely a matter of semantics, allowing a court to pick the
120. Id.
121. Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937 (5th Cir. 2000).
122. Id. at 940.
123. Id. at 941.
124. Id. at 942.
125. Id. at 943.
126. Id. at 945 (Jones, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 947 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Grace Bible Fellowship v. Maine Sch. Admin.
Dist. No. 5, 941 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1991)).
128. Id. at 949 (Jones, J., dissenting).
129. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001).
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label that will produce the desired result. What is important is whether
speech limitations are imposed on some groups prohibiting their access
to a forum that is generally open to others and whether the basis for
those limitations are reasonable and content neutral.' a In the words of
the Supreme Court, "government may not prohibit others from assem-
bling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. '
Unless the Supreme Court reconceptualizes the subject of fora cre-
ated on public property,'32 the only thing that remains clear is that the
forum in each of the school cases is not a traditional one such as a park or
a street. The problem of these cases appears only when the state itself
begins to design or designate the scope of the forum, another way of say-
ing that it undertakes to decide what groups will be allowed access to it.
If the designation takes the form of narrow exceptions to what would
otherwise be a nonpublic forum, a measure is at hand to determine if the
limitations are appropriate: the standard of whether a restriction is neces-
sary to preserve the purpose of the forum. This is a workable standard.
For example, if the public school should sponsor an after school program
designed to acquaint young people with driver education and safety
rules, the choice of the subject matter and the identity of the speakers
would be appropriately left within the tight control of the school authori-
ties to achieve the ends they have in mind.133 In a sense, these subject
matters and speakers are approved by the school in order to implement
its own speech, that is, the program that the school is trying to promote.
The difficulties begin to mount when we introduce the slippery
concept of a "limited public forum." One may assume that the ipse
dixit of a public authority that writes a use policy that includes some
groups and excludes others, is not conclusive on its legality. While
the public authority may be entitled to some discretion in drawing up
the bounds of the forum, it surely cannot act arbitrarily or unreasona-
bly. A forum of some public nature and magnitude is being created,
and a reasonable justification must be advanced for the restrictions
130. See Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
131. Id.
132. An incisive critique of the public forum concept may be found in Rosemary C. Salo-
mone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons from Lamb's Chapel,
24 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1994). An argument for the reformation of the forum doctrine is found in
the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy (joined by three other Justices) in International Society
of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693 (1992). An early and exhaustive analysis of
the doctrine of public forum is Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The His-
tory and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). See also Daniel A. Farber
& John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984).
133. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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that are imposed if a First Amendment claim is made by members of
the public seeking access.
It may be helpful to more sharply focus the discussion on the cir-
cumstances under review in the Campbell case. In Campbell, the
school board opened the facilities before and after school hours to out-
side groups to use for a wide range of civic and recreational purposes
and "other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community.' 134
Whether or not the exclusion of religious worship and religious in-
struction can be defended against the claim of viewpoint discrimina-
tion under the Lamb's Chapel approach may be debated, but in any
event, the public authority is still bound to justify the subject exclu-
sions as reasonable and necessary in light of the purpose that the fo-
rum it created serves. 135
Presumably, opening the school facilities outside the school day
does not impede the school district from performing its function of
educating its students. Having decided that the facilities should be
made available for outside uses "pertaining to the welfare of the com-
munity," the public authority is hard pressed to show that, in order to
preserve that purpose, it is necessary to exclude groups intending to
engage in religious worship or instruction. What is the purpose of the
forum during hours before or after the school day other than to ac-
commodate meetings and speech exchanges of members of the pub-
lic?' 36 Why is it any of the school's business if members of a group
consider their specific exchanges to be worship?
In a recent post-Good News Club decision, DeBoer v. Village of
Oak Park,137 the Seventh Circuit dealt with the question of where reli-
gious uses stand in comparison to other, more general uses. While not
involving the use of public school property, the court found that it
represented viewpoint discrimination to exclude a prayer meeting
from using the village hall because it was not a "civic program."138
The event in question was an observance of the National Day of
134. Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 940 (5th Cir. 2000).
135. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).
136. A portion of the policy of a Maine school district reflects the following approach:
"School facilities are community assets, and their utility should be maximized to the extent con-
sistent with the mission and function of the schools.... The School District plays an important
role as a positive social force in promoting community cohesiveness and stability, and policies
governing use should reflect that role." Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist.
No. 5, 941 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1991). Under this policy, the court held that that school district
could not refuse to lease facilities to a religious organization that planned to offer a free Christ-
mas dinner to the public at which an evangelical message was to be delivered by a minister. Id.
137. 267 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001).
138. Id. at 568.
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Prayer, which featured recitation of Biblical commentary, singing of
hymns, and prayers. The Village's policy was to permit groups to use
the hall for civic programs or activities that benefit the public as a
whole. The Village concluded that the program did not qualify as a"civic" event, which it defined as dealing with a citizen's relation to
government.'39 That position was upheld by the district court, which
decided that a program of prayer and worship was "inherently non-
civic in content. '"140 In reversing the lower court, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed that the prayer service was not a "civic program or activity,"
writing that:
A prayer service regarding civic issues is certainly distinct from
other types of discussion about civic matters informed by a reli-
gious perspective. However, that difference in form and tone
does not alter the reality that worship and prayer directed to-
ward the betterment of government and the enlightenment of
civil leaders are methods of expressing a religious viewpoint
about civic subject matter.'
Nevertheless, the court drew a line between a prayer service for a
national prayer day and the use of the hall for "worship services held
as part of a faith's regular religious regimen and bearing no relation-
ship to a specific civic purpose."' 42 There would, of course, be a seri-
ous problem under the Establishment Clause if the Village Hall en-
tered into an arrangement to become the permanent site of a church's
weekly worship, particularly if we assume that the option of perma-
nency of scheduled use was not available to all other outside groups.
Conceding the legitimacy of that concern, we should not lightly as-
sume, even if viewpoint discrimination is not alleged, that a worship
service does not come within the boundaries of a forum described by
such phrases as "welfare of the public." Moreover, the proposition
that religious worship on its face is not a "civic program or activity" is
problematic. The Village's reliance on a dictionary definition of
civic" as meaning "of, relating to, or belonging to a city, a citizen, or
citizenship" is defensible,' but it neglects a traditional and broader
understanding of "civic" as reflected in Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary: "1 : inherent in or owing or accruing to the indi-
vidual citizen : attendant on citizenship ... 2 : forming a component
139. Id. at 574. There were six different criteria set forth in the use policy of the village.
Id. at 561.
140. Id. at 567.
141. Id. at 569.
142. Id. at 570 n.l.
143. Id. at 567 n.7.
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of or connected with the functioning, integration, and development of
a civilized community (as a town or city) involving the common public
activities and interests of the body of citizens "144 Under the latter
definition, there is no apparent reason that a communal worship ser-
vice could not be considered a civic event.
VI. EQUAL ACCESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
One of Milford's defenses in Good News Club was a claim that
the school would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment if it granted the club's application to use school facili-
ties. 45 A majority of the Court thought so little of this claim that it
rejected it on the record'46 although Milford had prevailed in the lower
court on a motion for summary judgment based on a holding that
there had been no viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Hence, the lower courts had never
adjudicated the Establishment Clause issue.'47 Four Justices disagreed
with the majority's disposition of the Establishment Clause concern,
believing that there might be material facts that the parties still needed
to litigate before a court could make a judgment in that regard.'48
Whatever the merits of the policy arguments regarding a ruling
on a constitutional question "not addressed by either the District
Court or the Court of Appeals,"'49 it is hard to deny that the facts on
record before the Supreme Court offer meager support for a genuine
establishment issue. The policy statement for the community use of
the building after school hours authorized "instruction in any branch
144. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986).
145. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001).
146. Id. at 119-20 n.9.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
134 (Souter, J., dissenting). Since there was no serious exchange between the Justices over the
establishment issue, existing differences of opinion between factions of the Court remained in
place. Justice Breyer, in concurring with the majority, took time to point out that he was con-
tinuing to insist that government neutrality by itself did not conclusively resolve the establish-
ment issue. See id. at 127. This was in reaction to the opinion of four Justices in Capital Square,
maintaining that "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is
purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and
open to all on equal terms." Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995). This
formulation notably omits the endorsement test, which remains uncertain in application as evi-
denced by the differences of opinion among its supporters regarding the standards that govern it.
An example of these differences can be found in the debate between Justice Stevens, see id. at
797, and Justice O'Connor, see id. at 772.
149. Id. at 135. See generally Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The
General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1023 (1987); Rhett R. Dennerline, Pushing
Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985 (1989).
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of education."''s The club's meetings were not sponsored by the
school and were open to any student with parental consent. 15' Finally,
the teachers were not state employees, but private individuals. Once
we recognize that the state was only involved with its preliminary de-
cision to open the premises for a variety of community uses when
school was not in session, the claim that there was an attempt"respecting an establishment of religion"''1 2 rings hollow. The
majority ruled that the doctrine as developed in the earlier cases of
Lamb's Chapel and Widmar conclusively confirm that there is no
establishment problem in the case."'
On the other hand, the Justices who argued to remand the case to
litigate Milford's claim that allowing the club to meet would breach
the Establishment Clause primarily relied on two points: (1) that the
age of the children required special vigilance, and (2) a wide ranging
speculation about how other facts, if they were assumed to be present,
might affect the claim of establishment."14
The first point relates to the impressionability of young school
children in the lower grades, who supposedly might come to believe
that the state was giving its imprimatur to the religious teaching that
they were receiving in the classroom"' even though the teaching came
after class hours and from people who were private citizens and not
public school teachers. Any such anxiety, the Court found, is mis-
placed for a number of reasons. First, even young children would un-
derstand the difference between the established school hours with
their public school teachers and the gatherings under the supervision
of adults who are friends of their parents. Indeed, given the precocity
of children in an age of television, it is not unimaginable that at least
some would understand that, if they are being taught religion, the
state could not be the agent for such a message. Beyond that, consid-
ering that endorsement is the legal standard being measured, it is ludi-
crous to assume that children of tender years could meet the criteria
that have come to be associated with that test."6
150. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. D1).
151. Id. at 114-15.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119. In Widmar, Justice Stevens, on a developed record,
thought that the university's fear of violating the Establishment Clause was groundless because
there was no basis to think that it was sponsoring any particular religion, and student participa-
tion was entirely voluntary. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 280 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
154. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 141 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 113-14.
156. Id. at 115. As its proponent, Justice O'Connor has stated that the endorsement analy-
sis requires "careful and often difficult line-drawing and is highly content specific." County of
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Finally, the children are hardly the appropriate group by which
to gauge perceptions of constitutional significance inasmuch as they
are the dependents and wards of their parents, who made the decision
to have them attend the classes. As the majority opinion notes, par-
ents themselves would not be "confused about whether the school was
endorsing religion."' 7 It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor,
the proponent of the Court's endorsement analysis, voted with the
majority and did not express any concern about alleged messages of
endorsement.
In their analysis, the dissenters undertake to mention some of the
following facts that they think might be of significance in assessing an
Establishment Clause violation: the possibility that young children
(some of them perhaps upperclassmen) or bystanders may be loitering
outside the classroom following the regular school day; the presence of
school sponsored extracurricular activities under the direction of
school staff; the use or nonuse of facilities by other community groups
immediately after class; and "domination" of the forum by the Good
News students.' The dissenters are also bothered by the fact that the
Good News classes began immediately at the conclusion of the official
school day," 9 although Milford itself never objected in the lower
courts to the club's use of that time slot. 6 ° The dissenters seem to
consider the fact that the club might find it convenient for its own
purposes to hold the meetings right after school dismissal as reason
enough to question the constitutionality of the school making that ac-
commodation."'
The questions generated by the dissenters project a view of the
Establishment Clause that goes beyond the accepted restrictions im-
posed on public schools to prevent them from promoting religion as
part of the educational function that they perform. Rather, the strong
implication of these questions is that the school authorities are under
an obligation to guard the physical facilities from any religious con-
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989). "The reasonable observer in the endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which
the religious display appears." Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115.
158. Id. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. Id. Justice Souter notes that the club requested to use the school at 2:30 P.M. although
school was not out until 2:56 P.M. Id. at 144 (Souter, J., dissenting). The apparent reason for the
request was to be able to start the meeting promptly at 3:00 P.M. Id.
160. Id.atll4n.5.
161. See id. at 144 (Souter, J., dissenting). There does not seem to be any dispute that, as-
suming it acted in a neutral manner, the school could close the forum to all outside organizations
for a period of time following the last class.
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tamination after school hours by any expressions or activities of pri-
vate visitors to the premises. 6 2 Attributing the role of a sentinel to the
public schools to monitor and repel any manifestations of religion on
public property conflicts with the community use policy that the
schools adopted, which declares that the property is open for a wide
range of uses.'63 Once the class hours are over, the public school au-
thorities are simply custodians of the facilities.' 64 The speech in ques-
tion is private speech, not that of the government, and the state pre-
sumably has no mandate to censor it.
In the final analysis, the dogged resistance of the dissenters to the
prospect of any religious groups having equal access to the premises
after school hours is a corollary of their inability to appreciate that the
policy of community access is totally distinguishable from school-
sponsored prayer. 6 ' This lack of comprehension is reflected in the
dissenting comment of Justice Souter that the decision in Good News
162. In situations where state activity may be mistaken for endorsing a religious message of
a private group, Justice O'Connor argues that the Establishment Clause may impose "affirmative
obligations" on a state to avoid that perception. See Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In that respect, she maintains that "[t]he Clause is
more than a negative prohibition against certain narrowly defined forms of government favorit-
ism .... Id. However, in that case, just as she apparently did in Good News Club, Justice
O'Connor agreed that, considering all the facts of the case, when the Ku Klux Klan displayed a
cross on a public square, it conveyed a message of neutrality rather than endorsement. See id. at
772. In being ostentatiously skittish about the presence of religion on the property where noth-
ing indicates endorsement in an open forum, the state runs the risk of conveying hostility toward
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
163. Such an approach also seems inconsistent with the sentiments that President William
J. Clinton expressed in a memorandum on "Religious Expression in Public Schools," which he
issued on July 12, 1995. In declaring that the First Amendment does not convert the public
schools into "religious free zones," President Clinton decried the fact that "some school officials,
teachers and parents have assumed that religious expression of any type is either inappropriate,
or forbidden altogether, in public schools." Other portions of the statement may indirectly have
relevance to the Good News Club situation:
Generally, students may pray in a nondisruptive manner when not engaged in school
activities or instruction, and subject to the rules that normally pertain in the applica-
ble setting .... Students may also participate in before or after school events with re-
ligious content, such as "see you at the flag pole" gatherings, on the same terms as
they may participate in other noncurriculum activities on school premises.
Memorandum for the U.S. Secretary of Education and the U.S. Attorney General, Subject: Reli-
gious Expression in Public Schools, July 12, 1995. With respect to the subject of graduation
prayer and baccalaureates, the statement reads, in part: "If a school generally opens its facilities
to private groups, it must make its facilities available on the same terms to organizers of privately
sponsored religious baccalaureate services." Id. The 1995 guidelines, with changes not relevant
here, were reissued by the Department of Education on May 30, 1998.
164. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113.
165. This point is driven home in the Brief of Douglas Layock as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 7, Good News Club, 533 U.S. 101 (2001) (No. 99-2036) [hereinafter Layock
Brief]: "Government's duty is to protect both religious and secular speech and to remain neutral
between the two. In places where government permits expression of a diverse range of views, it
has neither the duty nor the authority to exclude religious speakers." Id. at 6-7.
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Club must stand for "the remarkable proposition that any public
school opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a church,
synagogue, or mosque."' 166 However, there is nothing remarkable
about the proposition that, under an equal access policy to public
buildings, those citizens deciding to meet for prayers or worship are
not precluded from exactly the same consideration for access given to
other "civic" groups using the facilities. While the terms under which
the access is allowed may be specified, 167 they presumably must be
uniform for all, and surely they cannot be limited by a condition relat-
ing to the religious identification of the user.
There are, to be sure, other considerations to take into account.
If the government undertakes to sponsor a prayer event of a private
individual or group or provides money to help finance it (neither ele-
ment was present in Good News Club), a violation of the Establishment
Clause is arguable. Even under those circumstances, however, it is vi-
tal for courts to consider whether other non-religious organizations are
treated in an affirmative fashion now being denied to an applicant be-
cause of religious identification. If equal access to government re-
sources is the controlling standard, the existence of state sponsorship
or even state funding may not be disqualifying. 6 '
Recently, in Gentala v. City of Tucson,'69 the Ninth Circuit pur-
sued the question of whether state funding is determinative. Gentala
was remanded for reconsideration in light of Good News Club. The
City of Tucson has a civic events fund, which provides support for
certain events proposed by private groups to be held in the public
park. 7' The events eligible for the minor financial help through the
fund (representing in the case at hand the amount of $340) must"celebrate and commemorate the historical, cultural and ethnic heri-
tage of the City and the nation, or increase the community's knowl-
edge and understanding of critical issues ... [;] generate broad com-
munity appeal and participation[;] instill civic pride in the City, state,
or nation[;] contribute to tourism[;] or are identified as unique com-
munity events."'' But the policy of the city will not consider support
for "events held in direct support of religious organizations." '172
166. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 139 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Layock Brief, supra note 165, at 6. For example, there might be a limit on the number
of times that any group might use the property in a given span of time.
168. For example, the Court held that the use of state funds to pay the tuition of a visually
handicapped person preparing for a career as a minister at a Christian college does not violate the
Establishment Clause. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
169. 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001).
170. Id. at 1068.
171. Id. (alterations and omission in original).
172. Id. at 1069.
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Plaintiffs in the case were representatives of a prayer committee
seeking to observe the National Day of Prayer proclaimed by Con-
gress annually.173
In upholding the City's denial of the application of the prayer
committee, the Ninth Circuit bypassed issues of forum and viewpoint
discrimination by invoking the principle that avoiding an Establish-
ment Clause violation is a sufficient reason to deny access even if there
is viewpoint discrimination. 174 In finding that the city was justified in
believing that approving the applications of the prayer committee
would violate the Establishment Clause, the court of appeals relied on
the fact that there would be tax funding of a religious organization in
addition to an endorsement of religion by the city. 17' Both of these
grounds for finding establishment violations are eminently arguable
and strongly disputed among the Justices on the Supreme Court.
In many respects, Gentala is comparable to Rosenberger,76 where
student activity fees were used to pay a third party contractor for the
printing costs of proselytizing religious literature published by a stu-
dent organization, one of a number of subsidized groups under a uni-
versity program. The Supreme Court in a 5-4 split found that the
program was not unconstitutionally subsidizing religion, but in Gen-
tala the Ninth Circuit distinguished Rosenberger in a detailed review of
the facts in both cases.
The remand to reconsider Gentala in the light of Good News Club
makes it likely that, whatever action is taken, the deep divisions on the
Court regarding the application of the Establishment Clause will re-
main. Although it will be interesting to see how they are resolved,
that is a story for a different day.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Local school boards in state operated or public schools have au-
thority over substantial assets in the form of educational facilities that
are sometimes idle with respect to public educational obligations and
that might profitably be used for other community purposes. Officials
adopt policies setting forth the purposes for which these facilities
might be utilized by private groups. Sensitive to the difficulties of sat-
isfying the general public as far as the no-establishment mandate of
173. Seeid. at 1067-68.
174. See id. at 1080. This goes further than the Supreme Court was willing to go in Good
News Club, where Justice Thomas wrote that it was not clear if avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation would justify viewpoint discrimination. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 112-13 (2001).
175. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1081.
176. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995).
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the First Amendment is concerned, the public school authorities often
hope to minimize controversy by broadly prohibiting the use of these
facilities for religious purposes. This effectively denies equal access to
public property by referring to the religious persuasion of some indi-
viduals and organizations.
Paradoxically, the exclusions designed in the minds of their au-
thors to minimize controversy tend to promote it. Good News Club re-
peats and reinforces the earlier teaching of the Supreme Court in
Lamb's Chapel that when public authorities create a public forum of
some nature, it is unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment to discriminate on the basis of religious viewpoint.
This lesson has not been entirely welcome in some quarters, and its
radiating implications have stirred reconsideration of the adequacy of
past definitions of. public fora, the claims of religious instruction and
worship as protectible speech interests, and the appropriate reach of
the Establishment Clause into the realm of private expressions on
public property.
